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NOTES
THE LAW ScHooL-Enrollment in the Law School for the year
1929-193o has reached 515,' the largest in the history of the school.

The continued increase in numbers is of itself a fact of no particular
significance; many schools have a larger student body than this. The
growth in size is important only when thought of in connection with
the selective admission system now in operation for its third year. All
students now in the law school have not only met the long standing
requirement of a college degree, but have satisfied the Admissions
Committee that they stand a reasonably good chance of being successful in their work in the school and, if so successful, that they are the
kind of persons who will be a credit to the profession. Each applicant
has had one or more personal interviews with the Admissions Committee, as well as a careful examination of his record. All of this
takes a great deal of time-there were applications this year from
more than a hundred in addition to those who could be accepted-but
the plan seems to be producing desired results both for the student
and the school. If it continues to do so, it is worth all the time and
effort involved.
Of the entering class, something less than half come from the
University of Pennsylvania. 2 The next highest college, it is interest' The division by classes is: First Year
Unclassified 3; Graduates 3.
2 The institutions represented are as
University of Pennsylvania:
42
College
50
Wharton School
8
Miscellaneous
ioo
Other Institutions:
129;

Collegio Francis (Mexico)
University of Havana (Cuba)
Albright
Allegheny
Amherst
Bucknell
Colgate
Cornell
Dartmouth
Dickinson
Franklin and Marshall
Gettysburg
Grove City
Harvard
Haverford
Juniata
Lafayette
Muhlenberg
Notre Dame

222;

Second Year 158; Third Year

follows:
Pennsylvania State
Princeton
St. Joseph's
St. Thomas
Susquehanna
Swarthmore
Syracuse
Temple
Thiel
University of Delaware
University of Illinois
University of New Mexic 0
University of Pittsburgh
University of the South
University of Virginia
Ursinus
Villanova
Washington and Jefferson
Wesleyan
Westminster
Williams
Yale
Total

II
18
4
3
I
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ing to note, is Princeton, with eighteen men. While the majority
come from other Pennsylvania colleges, many New England institutions and several from the west and south are also represented.
Several changes appear in the faculty. From Princeton has
come Mr. John Dickinson, as professor of law. Professor Dickinson
holds a Ph. D. degree from Princeton and an LL. B. degree from Harvard. He has practiced law in New York and California and taught
(inter alia) at Amherst, at Harvard and at Princeton. Articles by him
upon government and public law have appeared frquently in the legal
magazines. In addition, Mr. Dickinson is the author of "Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States"
(1927) in the Harvard Studies in Administrative Law.
Mr. Henry
Wolf Bikl6, who has taught Constitutional Law in the school for fifteen years, was compelled, by the demands of his practice, to relinquish
the work at the close of the year in 1929. Mr. Dickinson takes this
work, and in addition will give courses in Administrative Law, International Law, Public Service Companies and Quasi Contracts.
Professor Francis S. Philbrick, from the University of Illinois,
was last year Visiting Professor at the University of Pennsylvania.
Last spring he accepted an invitation to remain as Professor of Law.
Mr. Philbrick comes to the school from an experience in practice in
New York, and successful teaching at California, Northwestern and
Illinois. His courses are Equity, Property, Suretyship and a new
course, "Legal Analysis."
Mr. Stevens Heckscher, of the firm of Duane, Morris & Heckscher of Philadelphia, is giving the course on Legal Ethics, open to
the Third Year class. Mr. Heckscher is a graduate both of the Harvard Law School and that of the University of Pennsylvania. The law
school is fortunate in being able to secure his services for this course.
The last of the new appointments is that of the writer of this
note, Herbert F. Goodrich, to be professor of law and dean of the
Law School. Dean William E. Mikell, who has filled the office since
the retirement of Dean Lewis in 1914, last spring expressed his desire to be relieved of the administrative work of the school in order
to devote his time to teaching and research, especially in the field of
Criminal Law and Procedure. He and Professor Edwin R. Keedy,
it will be remembered, are the draftsmen of the Code of Criminal
Procedure for the American Law Institute. The request was complied with and Dr. Mikell relinquished his administrative duties on
June 30. He is this year giving the course in Criminal Law to the
First Year men and a seminar in Special Problems in Criminal Law.
His successor comes to Pennsylvania from Michigan, to which institution he came from the University of Iowa as professor of law in 1922.
He is now teaching the courses in Conflict of Laws and Bills and
Notes.
During the summer new stacks have been added in the Biddle
Law Library to make room for expansion. The Library now numbers 76,ooo volumes. A new law club, to be known as the William E.
Mikell Club, has been organized and quarters are being provided for
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it in the law building. Several new courses appear on the roster.
They are Dr. Mikell's seminar in Criminal Law, Legal Analysis by
Professor Philbrick, International Law and Administrative Law by
Professor Dickinson, and a course in Comparative Law by Assistant
Professor Register.
Herbert F. Goodrich; Dean.
THE O'FALLON CAsE-Now that there has been time for the

smoke to, clear away, it is possible to evaluate the decision rendered
in the O'Fallon case ' last May by the United States Supreme Court.
In a nutshell, the court has definitely and positively reaffirmed the
rule announced in S myth v. Amcs, 2 and restated without modification

in many subsequent cases,3 that value is something to be ascertained
by the application of sound judgment to all of the ascertainable pertinent facts and circumstances.
The case was a simple one. The Act of Congress required the
Interstate Commerce Commission to value property of the carriers
and, in this connection, to give due consideration to all the elements of
value recognized by the law of the land. For thirty years the law of
the land, as declared by the Supreme Court, had recognized the cost
of reproduction as one of the elements of value.4 The court found
that the commission had not taken this element into account. Therefore, because it had failed to follow the injunction of the statute, its
order attempting to determine value was without authority and void.
What gave the case its importance was the injection into it of an
effort to change the law of the land and to substitute what practically
amounted to a formula for the rule in Smyth v. Ames.5 The report
of the commission was an elaborate attempt to demonstrate that the
old rule should be modified. As to it the court says :6
"The report of the Commission is long and argumentative.
Much of it is devoted to general observations relative to the
method and purpose of making valuations; many objections are
urged to doctrine approved by us; and the superiority of another
view is stoutly asserted."
So that finally the real issue became, not what was the law of the land
at the time the valuation was made, but whether the court should
materially modify that law by its decision. This, as it has been said,
the court declined to do.
'St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. U. S., 49 Sup. Ct. 384 (1929).
'x69 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898).
See cases cited and analysed in Guernsey, Value in Confiscation Cases

(929)

77 U. oF PA. L. REv. 575.

' Ibid.
'SSupra note 2.
'Supra note i, at 388.
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There is no real basis for doubt as to the wisdom or soundness
of the court's conclusion. Where value is to be ascertained, there is
no course open except to determine as accurately and completely as
possible all of the factors directly or even remotely affecting the question, and then to exercise the best available judgment in according to
each the weight to which it is entitled in the particular case. The
value of anything of a permanent nature, whether it be a public utility
or a piece of real estate or what not, depends very largely upon the
future. It depends upon things that have not yet happened and are
not yet facts. To that extent it must be a prophecy, and cannot be a
computation. The values of street and interurban electric railways
have been tremendously influenced by the development of bus and
automobile transportation-a factor that twenty-five years ago was
not only actually non-existent but had not even taken form in the
imagination of those interested in such utilities. Illustrations might
be multiplied almost indefinitely. One factor affecting the value of
almost every kind of property is the course of development of the
community in which it is located. What it will cost to reproduce a
property must necessarily be a factor to be taken into account in
arriving at its value. There may be cases where its weight is almost
negligible, but there are others where it may easily be the predominating factor. The specific language of the Act of Congress, together
with the inherent nature of the value factor, made the court's conclusion inevitable.
It is true that there has been much controversy over the value
factor, and that if this controversy could be avoided it would effect
substantial savings not only in money but, what is equally important,
in the elimination of the effects of controversy on public relations.
But the remedy is not the adoption of an arbitrary rule which cannot,
in its application, give the value factor which must be ascertained.
The real remedy is for the parties to divest themselves of their partisan
attitudes and to cooperate in arriving at a sound conclusion. As soon
as they do this, it will be possible to ascertain value expeditiously and
economically, with all of the accuracy that is necessary. This is done
as to other classes of property and can be done as to railroads and
public utilities when the spirit of partisanship is eliminated.
The opinion should not be misinterpreted as holding that cost of
reproduction is a measure of value, or as determining the weight to
which it may become entitled in any particular case. It is not a
measure. It is a factor. It must be taken into account. It must be
given the weight to which the facts of the particular case entitle it.
This is the rule and must always be the rule if actual value is what is
to be worked out. The opinion does not sustain those who have
advocated cost of reproduction as a measure of value, nor does it sustain those who have urged the adoption of some formula the result of
whose application is to be taken as value. It leaves the situation
where sound economics and practical business leave it.
The difference which led to the dissenting opinion seems more
one as to a matter of fact than as to conclusions of law. The major-
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ity found that cost of reproduction was not taken into account. The
minority concluded that cost of reproduction had been taken into
account, that it did not appear that it had not been given the due consideration required by the statute, and that therefore the commission's
order should be sustained.
The important effect of the opinion is its clarification of the
situation. It removes the doubt and uncertainty injected into the
questions by the theorizing of the last fifteen or twenty years as to
this or that yardstick to be taken as a measure of value, and clearly
points out the rule that must be accepted as fundamental in working
out these questions.
Nathaniel T. Guernsey.
New York City.
CLAIM OF CUMULATIVE PREFERRED SHAREHOLDERS TO ARREAR-

AGES UPON DISTRIBUTION WHERE THERE ARE No EARNINGS-

Where stock is labelled "cumulative preferred" and there is an absence
of express provision on many points, the extent of a holder's interest
is not clear. Certain principles on the subject seem to be well settled.
Thus, in a dividend distribution, before junior shareholders may share,
cumulative preferred shareholders must first be paid a sum equal to
their stipulated preference for every year that has elapsed, regardless
of whether, in those years, there have been corporate earnings or not.'
So also, preferred stock
2 is said to be cumulative in absence of provisions to the contrary.
But an unsolved problem of some moment concerns preferred
shareholders who are given (a) a fixed yearly cumulative dividend
"payable out of profits," and (b) a preference on distribution up to
the extent of their capital contribution, plus the amount of "arrears
in cumulative dividends" if any. What is the extent of the claim, on
distribution of capital, of such cumulative preferred shareholders,
where for a number of years there have been no earnings or surplus ?3
'In an interesting case, where the majority of the preferred shareholders
renounced their right to back dividends, it was held that the current earnings
were attributable to the payment of dividends on all shares for the current
period, leaving the right to arrearages which dissenters had, a claim against
future surplus. Kennedy v. Carolina Public Service Co., 262 Fed. 803 (D. C.
N. D. Ga. i92o). In the ordinary situation any question of attributing payment
to "current dividends" or "back dividends" is not a problem.
' I COOK, CORPORATIONS (1923) 49. But see Collins v. Portland Electric
Power Co., 12 F. (2d) 671, 673 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926). Certainly the presence of
any word equivalent to "guaranteed" or "warranted" has this effect without
making the shareholders creditors of the corporation. Spear v. RocklandRockport Lime Co., II3 Me. 285, 93 Atl. 754 (1915). The rule announced may
require some modification because of the new interpretation now given to noncumulative preferred shareholders' rights, as to which see Berle, Non-Cuiulathe
Preferred.Stock (1923) 23 COL L. REV. 358; note (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 897.

'The shares may or may not be entitled to participate pro rata in further
capital distributions without affecting the'problem in question.
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Here, as in all situations of this type, the intention of the parties expressed in the contract is controlling, but the different results reached
in construing identical language in a frequently recurring situation,
warrant an inquiry as to the correct standard of interpretation.
In Michael v. Cavey-Caguas Tobacco Co.,4 the corporation for
six years had no earnings, and upon dissolution the assets were not
sufficent to pay common shareholders the par value of their stock after
paying the debts and the preferred shareholders their capital contribution. The preferred shareholders claimed in addition to their capital
contribution, a sum equal to their stipulated preference for each year
in which they received no dividend. 5 The court refused the claim,
principally, it would seem, in reliance on the dividend statute,' which
required dividends to be paid only from surplus.'
In striking contrast to this decision is the case of Johnson v.
Johnson.8 Preferred shareholders entitled to an accumulative preference,9 claimed on dissolution an amount equal to the stipulated pref4 igo App. Div. 618, i8o N. Y. Supp. 532 (1920).
'The certificate required that the preferred receive as dividends "when and
as declared, from the surplus or net profits of the company, a fixed yearly cumulative dividend of eight per centum. . . . In case of liquidation or dissolution
of the company . . . the surplus assets and funds of the company shall be
applied first, to the payment in full (of the) par value of said preferred shares,
and all accrued and unpaid dividends thereon."
.N. Y. STOCK CoRP,. LAw §28 (N. Y. ANN. CONS. LAWS [2d ed. 1917]
82o2) : "The directors of a stock corporation shall not make dividend!, except
from surplus profits arising from the business of such corporation, nor divide,
withdraw or in any way pay to the stockholders or any of them, any part of the
capital of such corporation."
"Matter of Hall & Co., Ltd., [igog] i Ch. 521 ("arrears of dividends on
dissolution" held to give a claim only in so far as there were undistributed
profits).
A note in (192o) 6 CoRN. L. Q. lO3, supposes the Michael case to be opposed to the earlier expressions of the New York courts, but an examination
does not reveal the truth of this observation. In Boardman v. Lake Shore, etc.,
R. R., 84 N. Y. 157, 174 (1881), a case involving "guaranteed" dividends, the
court of appeals said: "As they, are entitled to receive such dividends out of the
net earnings, and to have ten per cent. upon the investment, and this was absolutely guaranteed, it necessarily follows that in the event that such earnings
should not reach that amount or at any time failed, the dividends must afterward be paid from net earnings, when earned and received by the company. The
reasonable and fair interpretation of the contract is that the dividends were not
only preferred, but, being guaranteed, were cumulative and a specific charge
upon the accruing profits to be paid as arrears before any other dividends were
divided upon the common stock." This language does not cover the present
problem and is if anything a semble that where dividends are guaranteed the
payment of back unearned "dividends" may be more easily required. Prouty v.
Mich. Ry. Co., 1 Hun 655 (N. Y. 1874).
For comment see Warren, Rights of Holders of Preferred Stock (ig2i)
34 HARv. L. RIv. 303.
8
138 Va. 4 87 , 122 S. E. ioo (1924).
The appropriate charter provision granted a preference "out of the surplus
or net earnings . . . accumulative from and after such time as may be provided by the board of directors at the time of issuance thereof. . . . Incase
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erence, though for some years there were no earnings or surplus from
which the dividend could have been paid. In a well-considered
opinion the court held, relying on an earlier decision, 10 that the
preference on dissolution granted to them--"the amount of dividends
accumulated and unpaid thereon"-entitled the preferred shareholders
to their claim. Perhaps a greater number of reported cases can be
found supporting this holding 1- than the Michael case.
The study of these cases, revealing opposed points of view, indicates that the parties are attempting to ascribe to the words "cumulative" and "arrearage" a fixed legal content, where investigation
would show that none is sanctioned. Consequently when courts are
called on to construe the language, the results depend largely on the
astuteness of counsel and the background of the judges. If the rights
of shareholders are to be defined without too extensive verbiage, the
terms used for convenience must acquire a definite meaning. To
adhere to the view of the Michael case is to emphasize strictly that
legal incident of the word "cumulative," which is now used in contrast
to "non-cumulative," namely, the creation of a growing expectancy in
earnings. To adhere to the other view is to conceive of the dividend
claim as a fixed periodic charge on the corporation, redeemable at the
option of the board of directors out of surplus while the corporation
is going, but blooming into an actual credit much like interest charges,
when the corporation is to be wound up. The writer conceives of a
number of arguments that make the latter view the more desirable. 12
In the first place, if these "arrearages" refer merely to unpaid
,back earnings, then the granting of right to "arrearages" on distribuof liquidation or dissolution . . . the holders shall be paid the par amount of

their preferred shares and the anount of dividends accumulated and lupaid
thereon. . . ..
"Drewry, Hughes Co. v. Throckmorton, i2o Va. 859, 92 S. E. 8M8 (917).

The charter provisions granted a preference "out of earnings, (which) if not
earned in any one year, is to be cumulative and to constitute a preferred charge
over common stock, on the income of succeeding years, until the same is discharged; and the preferred stock is likewise to have a prior claim in the event
of liquidation or dissolution, to the amount of the face value and any arrears of
dividends due and unpaid. .... "
'National Bank v. Amoss, 144 Ga. 425, 87 S. E. 4o6 ('95) (semble,

that in a suit against common shareholders for unpaid subscription, preferred shareholders can recover full amount of preference) ; Langben v. Good-

man, 275 S. W. 84, (Tex. App. 1925) (dividends which became a claim on assets were said to "accrue" by mere lapse of time, weight being given to the
practical interpretation of the shareholders) ; Drewry, Hughes Co. v. Throckmorton, supra note io; In- re Springbok Estates, Ltd., [92o] i Ch. 563 ("arrears of dividends" construed to mean the deficiency between the amount of

dividend distributed while concern was going and total accumulated preference);

see In re Antimony Co., [1916] 2 Ch. 115.
"The writer is impressed with Professor W. W. Cook's article, "The Scientific Method of the Law" (1927)

13 A. B. A. J. 303, suggesting that the judge

must know two things in deciding the claim of a particular plaintiff: (i) what
social consequences or results are to be aimed at; and (2) how a decision one
way or the other will affect the attainment of those results.
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tion is mere surplusage; for the dividend preference alone would
protect the shareholder from having such earnings distributed to any
other class qua earnings or qua distributable assets. 13
The statutory requirements that dividends be only from surplus,
have reference only to a going concern, and are designed, like the
"trust fund doctrine," primarily to protect creditors.-4 They are
therefore no evidence of the shareholders' intention; and it would
seem improper to apply such statutory rules to determine the meaning
of "arrearage in dividend." The business understanding also seems
opposed to such a method of construction. 15
But the most forceful argument is to be found in a consideration
of the consequences of adopting the view of the Michael case. It is
the thesis of this note that a court of equity, in protecting the financial
interest of a shareholder, aims to prevent any action of the board of
directors the effect of which will be to divert to another the property
interests of any of the various groups of shareholders. Let us imagine
a corporation which has paid no dividend for a period of ten years and
which therefore is faced with the necessity of paying 6o per cent. to
the preferred shareholders before the common may get a dividend.
Assume that the assets of the corporation are still intact but that there
is no surplus out of which a dividend can be paid. Here, to permit
the company on dissolution to return the capital contribution to each
class without any payment of "arrears" to preferred, is to place just
such power in the "controller" of the corporation as is obnoxious to
the general policy of equity in such cases. By the device of dissolution and reorganization, the common shareholders, should they desire
to continue the business, find themselves in a much better financial
position at the expense of the preferred shareholders. Where such
dissolution and reorganization could be prevented as fraud,'" the effect
of the rule of the Michael case would still be to induce the common
shareholders to attempt to wind up the enterprise even though there is
a fair expectancy of future success. Relief from the onerous burden
of paying arrears which common must bear while the concern is going,
may still be sufficient inducement to common to abandon the enterprise.
" This is the argument approved in Johnson v. Johnson, supra note 8, at 495,
S. E., at 102: "If there are net earnings, they cannot be paid to common
stockholders, either before or upon distribution of the assets, until after the
prior claim of the preferred stockholders thereto have been satisfied. No additional safeguard then, as to the prior claim of the preferred shareholders upon
the profits would be either necessary or appropriate. In providing for the payment of the par value of the preferred stock with all of its unpaid accumulations out of the assets of the corporation, in liquidation, the purposo was to
furnish this additional security and to make the deferred and -unpaid dividends,
as well as the par value of the preferred stock, a claim upon the assets of such
a company superior to that of the common stock."
"'Williams v. Western Union, 93 N. Y. 162 (1883); Rorke v. Thomas, 56
N. Y. 559 (1874).
"See note (192o) 6 CORN. L. Q. 1O3.
" As to which see Fain, Limitations of the Statufory Power of Majority
Stockholders to Dissolve a Corporation (1912) 25 HARV. L. Ray. 677.
122
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It therefore appears that by adopting the view of the Johnson
case, a court of equity will be applying a rule of construction which
will preserve the interest of each class of shareholder and which will
carry out what seems to be the business understanding of the community.
J.R. Cades.
New York City.
THE STANDARD OF SKILL AND CARE GOVERNING THE CIVIL LIA-

BILITY OF PHYSICIANS-The action against a physician for malpractice is essentially in tort. True, the plaintiff may. on the same facts

declare either in assumpsit on the physician's implied contract to render competent services, or in case for negligence.' But in either form,
the gravamen of the action is the defendant's breach of the duty which
arises from the relation of physician and patient,2 a relation which
may exist independently of any contract between the parties.3 However, for its creation the physician's acquiescence is essential; under
no circumstances--despite the more or less prevalent motion among
lay persons to the contrary-is a physician legally obligated to render
professional services to everyone who applies to him. Although he be
the only one available, a physician may arbitrarily refuse to respond
to a call, and such conduct will not render him liable in damages. 4 For
although a physician's undertaking is of a public nature, 5 yet he has
the right possessed by any other "business expert" to serve whom he

pleases. 6

1 Sellers v. Noah, 2o9 Ala. 103, 95 So. 167 (1923) ; Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34
W. Va. 252, 12 S. E. 519 (189o). Contra: Finch v. Bursheim, 122 Minn. 152,
142 N. W. 143 (1913). This case is practically alone in holding the action
necessarily based upon a contract. See comment in (1913) 77 CENT. L. J. i9o.
'Carpenter v. Walker, 17o Ala. 659, 54 So. 6o (191o) ; Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis.591, 4o N. W. 228 (1888).
'Napier v. Greenzweig, 256 Fed. 196 (C. C. A. 2d, i919) ; Styles v. Tyler,
64 Conn. 432, 3o Ati. 165 (1894). Although the relation may be and usually is
created by a contract between the parties. Parkell v. Fitzporter, 3O Mo. 217,
227, 256 S. W. 239, 242 (1923). It is sometimes termed a "consensual" relation.
See Thaggard v. Vafes, rig So. 647 (Ala. 1928) ; Peterson v. Phelps, 123 Minn.
319, 143 N. W. 793 (1913) ; Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont. 645, 194 Pac. 488 (192o).
For a further discussion of the various theories upon which the malpractice
action may be grounded, see comment in (1929) 27 MIcH. L. REV. 474.
'Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N. E. lo58 (i9Oi). See also Tomer
v.Aiken, 126 Iowa 114, 118, 101 N. W. 769, 770 (1904).
Ballou v. Prescott, 64 Me. 305, 313 (1874) ; Parkell v. Fitzporter, supral
note 3, at 227, 256 S. W. 242; Turner v. Stoker, 289 S. W. I9O, 194 (Tex. 1926).
The physician is not to be likened in this'respect to innkeepers, common carriers,
and the like who are bound to serve the public. Hurley v. Eddingfield, supra
note 4, at 417, 59 N. E. lO58.
6 The character of a physician's undertaking is not comparable in all respects, however, to that of the ordinary "business expert" such as the engineer,
the mechanic, or the broker. The latter is an insurer of results, whereas the
physician does not guarantee to cure his patient. See Styles v. Tyler, supra
note 3, at 463, 30 Atl. 176; Almond v. Nugent, 34 Iowa 300, 303 (1872) ; Gal-
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Having once assumed charge of a case, however, he may not
abandon it in the same arbitrary manner in which he might have
refused to accept it. He must continue his visits, prescribe remedies,
and direct treatment until he may with safety to the patient cease
doing so, or until the latter dismisses him.' If he desires to leave a
patient before such time, he must give sufficient notice of his intention,
to enable the patient to procure aniother physicians Furthermore,
throughout the attendance required of him, the character of the physician's professional services must be such as reveals a reasonable degree
of skill and care.
There is some authority for the proposition that the physician at
early common law was liable only for gross negligence, or lata culpa 10
-that is, such conduct as revealed profound ignorance of the very
rudiments of his profession or the most apparent negligence in the
performance of his professional duties."- The explanation of this
attitude is usually said to lie in the fiction that the physician rendered
his services from purely philanthropic motives. His was a "noble profession," and while it was lawful for him to accept an honorarium or
gratuity, fees were not considered demandable as of right. Hence,
without an express promise to that effect, he could maintain no action
lagher v. Thompson, Wright 466, 467 (Ohio 1833). By a special contract, however, the physician may bind himself to be responsible for results. Leighton v.
Sargent, 27 N. H. 46o (1853).
'Ballou v. Prescott, supra note 5; Nash v. Royster, 189 N. C. 4o8, 127 S. E.
356 (1925); Young v. Jordan, 145 S. E. 41 (W. Va. 1928).
'Lathrope v. Flood, 63 Pac. ioo7 (Cal. 19Ol); Stohlman v. Davis, 220
N. W. 247 (Neb. 1928). See (1929) 7 NF. L. BULL 287. If reasonable notice

be given it would appear that the physician has the same right to summarily
dismiss the patient that the latter has to dismiss the physician. See Ballou v.
Prescott, supra note 5, at 3o8. But if he has bound himself to attend the patient
for a certain time, notice by the physician of his intention to discontinue his
services will not relieve him. See Hood v. Moffett, 1O9 Miss. 757, 767, 69 So.
664, 666 (1Q15).

That he has taken on other patients who require his presence has frequently
been held not to excuse the physician for a failure to attend his patient. Sinclair v. Brunsen, 212 Mich. 387, 18o N. W. 358 (i92o) ; Young v. Jordan, supra
note 7. These cases are based upon the maxim "as a man consents to bind himself so must be be bound"-a maxim which seems inapplicable to the relation of
physician and patient if it be conceded that that relation is not necessarily contractual. When he has assumed incompatible obligations the physician's liability
should, it seems, depend upon whether he was duly careful in entering into both
relations. To hold otherwise is to act harshly toward the physician who may
be entirely the victim of circumstances. See 21 R. C. L. 390.
'Moore v. Smith, 215 Ala. 592, III So. 918 (1927) ; Foreman v. Hunter,
36 Cal. App. 762, 173 Pac. 391 (1918) ; James v. Grigsby, 114 Kan. 627, 22o Pac.
267 (1923) ; Curran v. Holt, 117 Me. 369, lO4 Atl. 579 (918).
" Baikie v. Chandless, 3 Camp. 17 (18II) ; Purvess v. Landell, 12 C. & F.
91 (1845) ; Laidler v. Elliott, 3 B. & C. 738 (1825). The term "physician" as
used in these cases is said not to have included the ordinary surgeon.
U

See Purvess v. Landell, supra note io, at 99.
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to recover compensation for his services.2
In this respect he was like
the attorney 1 3 and the arbitrator; 14 and therefore it was believed that
the rule of liability applicable to these latter two should likewise be
applied to the physician-namely, liability for gross negligence only.13
The law of our country, however, has never been so lenient
toward the physician. The proof of gross negligence is" not here
required,' 6 the rule having always been that7 ihe physician is liable for
a want of ordinary skill, care, or diligence.1
American ideals of liberty and equality had little sympathy for
any distinction between noble and common persons, honorable and
ordinary callings, and so the fiction concerning the purely honorary
character of the physician's profession never found favor'here.'
The
law in this country has always implied a promise on the part of the
Chorley v. Bolcot, 4 T. R. 317 (179) ; Lipscombe v. Holmes, 2 Camp. 441
(I8io) ; 3 WHARTON & STILLES, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1905) § 480.

But a recovery might be had on a special contract for such services. Veitch v.
Russell, 3 Q. B. 928 (1842).
' Turner v. Phillips, Peake (Amer. ed.) 122 (1792) ; see 3 BL. CoMM. 28.
"Virany v. Warne, 4 Esp. 47 (i8oi); Hoggins v. Gordon, 3 Q. B. 466
(1842).
' Cases supra note io. The term "physician" as used in these cases is said
not to have included the ordinary surgeon-the latter being entitled to recover
for services rendered. 3 WHARTON & STILLEs, loc. cit. supra note 12, and cases
there cited. As to the liability of a surgeon see Seare v. Prentice, 8 East. 347
(i8o7) ; Lanphier v. Phipos, 8 C. & P. 475 (1838). In the United States no such
distinction between a "physician" and a "surgeon" is made. SHEARMAN & RDFIELD, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (6th ed. 1913) § 6o3. By the passage of the Medical
Act in i858 (21 & 22 VIcT. c. 90, § 31, modified in I886 by 49 & 50 VIcr. c. 48,
§ 6) the physician became legally entitled to compensation for professional
services. Gibbon v. Budd, 2 H. & C. 92 (1863). Since that time the competency
required of him has been of a higher degree than was formerly the case. Rich
v. Pierpont, 3 F. & F. 35 (1862).
"Landon v. Humphrey, 9 Conn. 209 (1832).
" Woodlawn Infirmary v. Byers, 216 Ala. 210, 112 So. 831 (1927) ; Landon
v. Humphrey, supriz note 16; Tucker v. Stetson, 233 Mass. 81, 123 N. E. 239
(i919) ; Howard v. Grover, 28 Me. 97 (1848) ; Barnard v. Schell, 85 Pa. Super.
329 (1925) ; SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, op. cit. suprc note i5, § 6o6. "Skill" refers

to professional knowledge; "care" refers to the application of that knowledge. It "
is immaterial whether the patient's injury results from lack of skill or a failure
properly to exercise it. McCracken v. Smathers, 122 N. C. 799, 29 S. E. 354
(I898). The terms "physician" and "surgeon" are used interchangeably by the
courts, no distinction being made between their liabilities. Ibid. § 6o3.
The rules which are applied to physicians and surgeons are likewise held
applicable to practitioners of the kindred branches of the healing art, such as
dentists, occulists, etc.

McDonald v. Harris, 131 Ala. 359, 31 So. 548 (1901) :

Black v. Bearden, 167 Ark. 455, 268 S. W. 27 (1925). Or to anyone-licensed
or not-who holds himself out as competent to treat human maladies. Hansen
v. Pock, 57 Mont. 53, 187 Pac. 282 (1920)

(a Chinese herb doctor) ; Nelson v.

Harrington, szupra note 2 (a clairvoyant). But one who does not profess to be a
healer but who attends a sick person merely as an act of kindness, and without
expectation of reward, is not liable as a physician. Higgins v. McCabe, 126
Mass. 13 (1878). See McNevins v. Lowe, 40 Ill. 209, 210 (1866).
' Judah v. M'Namee, 3 Blackf. 269, 271 (Ind. 1833).
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patient to pay a reasonable compensation for the physician's services19
This fact is often said to explain why the American rule governing a
physician's liability was more exacting than was the common law rule
in England.2 °
Yet this explanation in itself does not seem sufficient. For our
courts have repeatedly held that because in a particular case a physician's services were rendered gratuitously does not alter the rules of
liability applicable to him.2 - It would seem that the real basis of the
American decisions is to be found in the public nature of the physician's undertaking. 22 The health of its citizens is a matter of grave
concern to the State, and the practice of ignorant or negligent men
who hold themselves out as physicians must be rigorously curbed.
Having announced the general rule of liability, the American
courts usually amplify it by setting up some test by which the jury 23
in a particular case may determine whether the defendant physician 24
possessed and used the requisite skill, care, and diligence in rendering
professional services to his patient. The form which such a test has
assumed varies infinitely, but in substance there appears to be but one
test which the courts apply-that is, whether the physician had and
used such skill, care, and diligence as is ordinarily had and used by
or similar localities and under the
the medical profession in the same
2 5
same or similar circumstances.
' Starrett v. Miley, 79 Ill. App. 658 (i88) ; Judah v. M'Namee, supra note
18; Mooney v. Lloyd, 5 S. & R. 412 (Pa. 18ig).

However, when a stranger

calls a physician to care for an injured person no promise is implied on the part
of the stranger to pay for the physician's services. Boyd v. Sapington, 4 Watts
247 (Pa. 1835) ; Smith v. Watson, 14 Vt. 337 (1842).
'Hewitt v. Charier, 16 Pick. 353 (Mass. 1835); Graham v. Gautier, 21
Tex. iII (1858) ; SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, op. cit. szpra note I5, § 603.
' Napier v. Greenzweig, sitpra note 3; Peterson v. Phelps, sznpra note 3;
DuBois v. Decker, 13o N. Y. 325, 29 N. E. 313 (i89i). This fact is strong evidence that the liability of the physician is not based on contract. Cases supra
note 3.
' See Thaggard v. Vafes, szpra note 3, at 649; Ballou v. Prescott, supra
note 5, at 313; Heath v. Gleason, 3 Ore. 64, 68 (1869) ; Wood v. Clapp, 4 Sneed
65, 68 (Tenn. 1856) ; Turner v. Stocker, supra note 5, at 194.
' Whether a physician in a particular case possessed the requisite skill, care,
and diligence is a question of fact for the jury. Slade v. Harris, IO5 Conn. 436,
440, 135 Atl. 570, 572 (1927) ; Chesley v. Durant, 243 Mass. I8O, 182, 137 N. E.
301, 302 (1922) ; Cassingham v. Berry, 67 Okla. 134, 137, 168 Pac. io2O, 1020
(1917).

"' The same facts which constitute a right of action against a physician in a
malpractice suit will serve as a bar to the physician's recovery in his suit for
compensation. Styles v. Tyler, supra note 3.
"The cases are legion which support this rule. Among them are: Dunman
v. Raney, ii8 Ark. 337, 176 S. W. 339 (1915) ; Nelson v. Sandell, 202 Iowa 1O9,
2og N. W. 44o (1926) ; Tucker v. Stetson, supra note 17; Trask v. Dunnigan,
299 S. W. 116 (Mo. 1927) ; Stohlman v. Davis, supra note 8. The "locality" is
not the place where the services are rendered but where the physician is located
and conducts his practice.
718, 722 (1923).

Hoover v. McCormick, 197 Ky. 509, 517, 247 S. W.

NOTES

Some cases hold that a physician must possess and exercise that
degree of skill and care which is ordinarily had and exercised in his
profession in the locality in which he practices.26 It has been said that
such a rule embraces an improper test differing substantially from that
which the majority of courts have adopted.2 1 For if in a particular
locality there are but a few persons practicing medicine, and they be
quacks or incompetent pretenders, any one of them, if sued for malpractice, can-if he is to be judged according to the ability of fellowpractitioners in the same locality--evade liability by the plea that his
skill and28 care is of the same degree as that of his equally incompetent
fellows.
But such an unusual situation was obviously not contemplated by the courts which applied this last test. Under the particular
circumstances of each case before these courts it was probably a fair
assumption that there were reputable and ordinarily capable physicians
in the locality in which the defendant practiced. 29 In such a situation
it matters little whether the standard of competence be the ordinary
practice of the same locality or of similar localities, although the latter
The phrase "in the same general neighborhood" is sometimes substituted for
that of "the same or similar localities." Sellers v. Noah, supra note i; Carraway v. Graham, 118 So. 8o7 (Ala. 1928) ; Barnard v. Schell, supra note 17. The
two phrases, however, carry the same connotation in this connection. See McCracken v. Smathers, supra note 17, at 804, 29 S. E. at 355.
Two additional rules, expressed as corollaries to the principal test, are generally announced in the cases. The one is that a physician is not liable for an
honest mistake or error of judgment in making a diagnosis, or prescribing a
mode of treatment, where the proper course is subject to reasonable doubt.
Moore v. Smith, supra note 9; Staloch v. Holm, oo Minn. 276, 111 N. W. 264
(i9o7) ; Remley v. Plummer, 79 Pa. Super. 117 (1922). The other is that in
testing a physician's skill and care, regard must be had to the advanced state of
the profession at the time the treatment was given. Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn.
167, 27 Atl. 1116 (1893) ; Teft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46 (187o).
The treatment adopted by a physician is to be tested by the principles and
practices of his particular school and not by those of some other school. Patten
v. Wiggin, 51 Me. 594 (1862) ; Floyd v. Michie, ii S. W. (2d) 657 (Tex. 1928).
To constitute a school of medicine, it must have rules and principles of practice for the guidance of all its members. Nelson v. Harrington, supra note 2.
If one who holds himself out as a healer of disease belongs to no recognized
school he is to be held to the degree of skill and care exercised by physicians
who do represent such recognized schools. Hansen v. Pock, mtpra note 17;
Nelson v. Harrington, supra note 2. Contra: Spead v. Tomlinson, 73 N. H. 46,
59 At]. 376 (i9o2), in which it was held that a Christian Scientist was to be
judged by the standard of skill and care of the ordinary Christi=aScientist.
Kalloch v. Hoaglund, 239 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917); Johnson v.
Clarke, 276 Pac. io52 (Cal. 1929); Telaneus v. Simpson, 12 S. W. (2d) 92o
(Mo. 1928); Krompoltz v. Hyman, 70 Pa. Super. 58i (I919); Haskins v.
Howard, 16 S. W. (2d) 2o (Tenn. 1929).
' Krinard v. Westerman, 279 Mo. 68o, 216 S.W. 938 (i919).
' See Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497, 501 (1877) ; Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky.
20, 24, 69 S. W. io96, io97 (1902) ; Pelky v. Palmer, ioo Mich. 561, 563, 67

N. W. 561, 563 (I896) ; McCracken v. Smathers, supra note 25, at 803, 29 S.E.
at 355.
'See Whitsell v. Hill, io Iowa 63o, 637, 7o N. W. 750, 751 (1897) ; Pelky
v. Palmer, supra note 28, at 563, 67 N. W. at 56i.
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phrase, because it is less likely to be misinterpreted, would seem
preferable.
But why, it might be asked, is it necessary to impose any limitation at all as to locality when stating the general rule of a physician's
liability? Why not merely instruct the jury that the physician must
have and exercise ordinary skill, care, and diligence and leave it to
them to determine from the testimony of expert witnesses just what
constitutes such skill, care, and diligence? Indeed, in England, since

the passage of the Medical Act,30 this has been held the proper procedure.31 In earlier days it seems also to have satisfied the American
courts. 3 2 It seems to have been regarded as inadequate only when
they began to take judicial notice of the fact that certain classes of
physicians displayed greater competency than did others. Thus the
physician of the city generally displayed greater skill than did his
brother of the outlying districts-the "country doctor." 3 3 The reasons
which the courts recognized as explanatory of and justifying the lesser
competency of the latter were two. First, the cities, being the more
lucrative fields for employment, generally, and very naturally, attracted the more talented of the profession. 4 Secondly, the cities
afforded greater facilities for developing professional skill than did
"'Supra note
'Rich

I5.

v. Pierpont, suprar note 15, where the court said at p. 40:

".

•

.

he

was bound to have that degree of skill which could not be defined, but which in
the opinion of the jury was a competent degree of skill and knowledge. What
that was the jury were to judge."
'Landon v. Humphrey, supra note 16; Howard v. Grover, supra note 17;
Leighton v. Sargent; Gallagher v. Thompson, both supra note 6. The general
rule without limitation is occasionally announced by the later cases. Foreman v.
Hunter; Curran v. Holt, both supra note 9; Cassingham v. Berry, supra note
23, where the court said at 137, 168 Pac. at io2o: "What under the circumstances amounts to reasonable and ordinary care, . . . is a question of fact
for the jury."
' Gramm v. Boener, supra note 28; Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286 (1872);
Tefft v. Wilcox, supra note 25; Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (i88o) ; Pelky
v. Palmer, supra note 28.
It would be impossible to divide all physicians into just two broad classes"country doctors" and "city doctors." There are countless communities of
varying sizes too large to be classified as rural and yet too small to be termed
cities. The practitioner of such communities is to be held to the degree of competence prevailing in similar communities. Vander Wal v. Abbott, 167 N. W.
182 (Iowa 1918); Mason v. Gidder, 154 N. E. 519 (Mass. 1926); Trask v.
Dunnigan, supranote 25.
The specialist of course exhibits greater competency than the general practitioner. A specialist is anyone who holds himself out as being particularly
skilled in any branch of the medical profession. Of him the law exacts a
greater amount of skill and care than of the general practitioner. Pantazatos v.
Jelm, 17 Ohio App. 258 (1923) ; Rayburn v. Day, 126 Ore. 135, 268 Pac. 1002
(1928) ; Rann v. Twitchell, 82 Vt. 79. 71 AtI. 1045 (i9o6). Conversely, a general practitioner is not to be held to the high degree of care and skill demanded
of the specialist. Wohlert v. Seibert, 23 Pa. Super. 213 (9o3).
' See Burk v. Foster, supra note 28, at 25, 69 S. W. at io97.

NOTES

the rural communities.3' Under these circumstances td attempt to
hold the country practitioner up to the standard of skill and care required of the city physician would tend only to drive the average rural
doctor from the profession and leave countless country communities
without sufficient medical attendance. The courts, therefore, accepting the varying degrees of competency as a fact, adapted the rule
governing a physician's liability to that fact.
The terms "country," "city," "town," and "village" are seldom
employed by the courts when stating the test; the terms "locality," 31
"'vicinity," 37 "community," 38 and "neighborhood," 39 however, are
commonly found. The courts make no attempt to define just the
amount of territory any one of these terms is intended to include. It
is fairly certain, however, that they are meant to designate the entire
organdzed community in which the defendant physician practiced. It
may be only a small town or village such as Oskaloosa, Iowa; 40 or
Sullivan, Mo.; 41 or it may equally be an entire metropolis such as
St. Louis, M.o 42 But never do these terms appear to be used to refer
to a subdivision of a community, regardless of how large such community may be. Indeed, it has been indicated that the word "neighborhood" as employed in the test of a practitioner's competency, is not
to be understood in its common sense-as comprising a very limited
area. 43 Thus it would appear that the law would make no distinction,
so far as the skill required of physicians is concerned, between the
poorer and the better districts of a large town or city. True it might
seem that the former districts, while holding out the same opportunities for developing professional skill-such as hospitals, accessibility
of professional literature and appliances, etc. 4 4 -would attract only the
less competent and less efficient of the profession, and that the law
should make allowance for this fact in determining whether the requisite competency was displayed, just as it does in the case of the country
' Tefft v. Wilcox, supra note 25, at 63; Burk v. Foster, supra note 28, at 25,
6! S. W. at io97. Among the better facilities which these cases discuss as being
available in the cities are large hospitals, the availability of new books and
appliances, the ability to observe the various accidents and forms of disease,
and the intercourse among professional men resulting in the free interchange of
new modes of treatment.
Pearson v. Crabtree, 70 Cal. App. 52, 232 Pac. 7,5 (1924) ; Owens v.
McCleary, 313 Mo. 213, 28i S. V. 682 (1926).
'Knopp v. Thornton, i99 Ky. 216, 250 S. W. 853 (1923); Wohlert v.
Seibert, supra note 33.
' James v. Grigsby, supra note 9; Hales v. Raines, 346 Mo. App. 232, 330

S. W. 425 0I9,O).
'Infirmary v. Byers, supra note 17; Slimak v. Foster, io6 Conn. 366, 138
At]. 153 (1927) ; Barnard v. Schell, supra note 17.
"Vander Wal v. Abbott, supra note 33.
41 Trask v. Dunnigan, supra note 25.
McClarin v. Grenzfelder, i47 Mo. App. 478,

McCracken v. Smathers, supra note
"See supra note 35.

25,

126

at 8o3,

29

S. W. 817 (i9io).
S. E. at 355.
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doctor. But, although this problem seems never to have been presented to the courts and it is difficult to estimate the force of the argument suggested above, the tenor of the decisions would seem to indicate that the physician practicing in a poorer section of the city is to
be considered in the same "locality" or "neighborhood" as the physician maintaining well-equipped offices in a centrally located professional building, and that the same degree of skill and care is to be
required of each.
Some American courts, not content with having defined ordinary
skill, care, and diligence, have attempted to explain to the jury just
what the expression "ordinary physician" of the same or similar localities means. For example, it has been declared that the ordinary
physician is the average physician of the same or similar localities. 5
This, however, is not accurate. For if all the physicians of a locality
-the novices, the quacks, the bad, and the very best-be aggregated
into a common class and an average struck between them, that average
would in all probability be too low to insure any reasonable degree of
competency.46 The term "ordinary physician" contemplates not what
is actually the average physician of the same or similar localities, but
rather the reasonably intelligent and competent physician of such
localities in good standing.4" To attempt to be more specific in such
a case is to risk being less accurate. Nor does there appear to be any
necessity for being more specific. The "ordinary physician" is no less
comprehensible a term than is the "reasonable man," so familiar to
juries in ordinary negligence cases. The only distinction between the
two is that the former must be applied by the jury with the aid of
expert testimony,48 whereas the latter can be understood in the light
of the jurors' common knowledge and experience.
ISchillinger v. Savage, i86 Ind. 189, i15 N. E. 321 (1916) ; Smothers v.
Hanks, supra note 33; Hollis v. Ahlquist, I42 Wash. 33, 25, Pac. 871 (1927) ; 3
WHARTON & STILLES, op. Cit. supra note 12, § 477.

Sometimes the skill and care of the average member of the medical profession as a whole is set up as a standard without any limitation as to locality
whatsoever. Mackenzie v. Carman, IO3 App. Div. 246, 92 N. Y. Supp. io63
(i9o5). Taken literally such a standard could not be fairly applied to urban
dnd rural physician alike.
' Small v. Howard, supra note 33, where the court said at 136: "The jury
could hardly have supposed that the skill required of the defendant was merely
the average skill of all practitioners, educated and uneducated, permanent and
occasional, regulars and interlopers alike"; see also WHARTON, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (874) § 734.
'Holtzman v. Hoy, 1i8 Ill. 534, 8 N. E. 832 (i886). Most courts express
this thought by merely using the description "member of the profession in good
standing." Comeaux v. Miles, II8 So. 786, 787 (La. 1928); Seewald v.
Gentry, 220 Mo. App. 367, 372, 286 S. W. 445, 447 (1926).
In determining whether the requisite skill and care were had and used by
the physician, expert testimony is generally required. Slimak v. Foster, supra
note 39; Nelson v. Sandell, supra note 25. But the circumstances may be such
as to warrant the inference of a want of care from the testimony of
laymen, or in the light of the knowledge and experience of the jurors them-

NOTES

Should the practice of medicine ever become an exact science,
with its principles reduced to precise methods and unalterable formula
by means of which proper treatment in any particular case could be
specified with certainty, we might well expect the rules governing a
physician's liability to be more stringent than they now are.49 The
manipulation of the X-ray, according to a recent decision,50 has become
such a science. The X-ray machine was invented in 1907, and in its
use physicians were generally held to a degree of skill and care analogous to that required in the practice of medicine generally-that is,
such as was ordinarily had and used by physicians employing the Xray in the same or similar localities and under the same or similar circumstances. 5 But in the opinion of the court which decided the case
of Giles v. Tyson 52 there is but one proper use of the X-ray in any
given situation-what that proper use is must be determined by reference to certain fixed and accepted formuhe, a thorough knowledge of
which must be acquired and applied by anyone who would use the
machine. Without such knowledge a physician, whether he be in New
York City or in some distant rural community, uses the X-ray at his
peril.
The practice of medicine for the most part, however, is not an
exact science; its principles have not yet been resolved into exact
formulae. There are comparatively few things in the field of medicine
which are considered settled. New developments and discoveries are
occurring daily. It is only the exceptional physician, most advantageously located, who can keep abreast of the constant changes in the
principles and practice of medicine-to demand that every practitioner
selves. Evans v. Roberts, 172 Iowa 653, 154 N. W 923 (1915) (a surgeon while
performing an adenoids operation cut the patient's tongue). When an operating
surgeon has left a foreign substance in his patient's body, expert testimony is

not required to establish his negligence. Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135
PaC. 235 (913) (a surgeon left a twelve inch spring in his patient's body).
Nor, when a sponge or gauze pad has been left in a wound during an operation,
is it conclusive upon the jury that the defendant complied with a general custom
among surgeons of leaving the sponge count to attendant nurses. Walker v.
Holbrook, 130 Minn. io6, 153 N. W. 305 (1915). While the nurse may have
been negligent in making her count, the duty to remove the sponges rests
primarily upon the surgeon and is non-delegable. The jury must be satisfied that

he exercised due care in seeing to their removal. Rayburn v. Day, spra note 33.
Upon the general question of the competency and value of expert opinions of
other physicians see Brewer v. Ring, 177 N. C. 476, 99 S. E. 358 (i919) and

cases there cited.
" Some things are today considered settled, and these must be applied by
every practitioner regardless of his school or location. See Tefft v. Wilcox,
supra note 25, at 62; Pike v. -Honsinger, 155 N. Y. 2oi, 210, 49 N. E. 760, 762
(1898) ; SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, op. cit. supra note 15, § 609.
'oGiles v. Tyson, 13 S. IV. (2d) 452 (Tex. 1929).
't Black v. Bearden, supra note 17; Stemons v. Turner, 274 Pa. 228, 117 At].
922 (1922); Nixon v. Pfahler. 279 Pa. 377, 124 At. 130 (1924); Kuehneman
v. Boyd, 193 XVis. 588, 214 N. W. 326 (1927).
'Supra note 50.
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do so would be eminently unjust.53 The standard of the ordinary
physician practicing in the same or similar localities as that in which
the defendant practiced seems at present best calculated at once to protect the faithful and conscientious practitioner from any loss by reason
of matters for which it would be unreasonable to hold him responsible,
and at the same time to guard the public against the practice of incompetent persons who hold themselves out as physicians.
A. J. S., II.
It has been suggested that the law should require of the physician the use
of that skill and diligence ordinarily exercised by the thoroughly educated physician. Beck, dissenting, in Smothers v. Hanks, supra note 33, at 296.

